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Team or Individual: What Determines 





This paper uses data from a firm with team production to investigate the association between 
workers’ productivity, risk aversion and preferred bonus scheme (team or individual). 
Standard economics make a strong prediction in this case. Workers persistently producing 
above the team average should vote for an individual bonus. The only concern that may 
moderate this preference is risk aversion. The economic model predicts the case at hand fairly 
well. Relative work place productivity is strongly associated with a preference for individual 
bonuses, and risk aversion is associated with a preference for a team bonus. There is, 
however, one noticeable exception to this pattern: a substantial fraction of low performers 
prefer an individual bonus. I argue there are two types of other regarding concerns that can 
explain why under-performers prefer a payment system that reduces their  income; 
distributional fairness and social emotions. 
JEL-Code: J330, D630. 
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Individuals who participate in economic laboratory experiments are surprisingly generous. In 
lab simulated labour relations many “workers” display considerable non-selfish behaviour, 
indicating a range of social motivations.  Are real workers in real firms equally willing to 
reciprocate, share and reduce income inequality?   
The answer has great practical relevance. The effectiveness of financial incentives 
depends critically on workers’ motivation.  Individuals who feel uncomfortable when their 
colleagues’ are lagging behind work harder under a piece rate than in a tournament (Bandiera 
et al 2005).  Workers who dislike income inequality may produce more under a team bonus 
than under an individual bonus (Engelmaier  and Wambach 2010).  In addition, when workers 
exhibit social preferences the firm can incentivize performance not only by paying their 
workers extra income, but also – for example – by paying them respect (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson 2007).   
It is disputed to what extent the level and structure of the pro-sociality observed in the 
lab carries over to economic exchange in the field (Levitt and List 2007).  But despite its 
importance, there are relatively few empirical studies assessing the relevance of social 
preferences at real workplaces.  This paper contributes to that limited literature.   
The data is from a customer service centre of an insurance company.  It is an inbound 
call centre where agents are organized in teams.  They provide customer services 
(information) and they sell new insurance products.  The firm has for a long time (since 2001) 
used monetary incentives to boost performance, especially sales. The sales bonus has, in 
varying degree, rewarded both individual and team sales.  In a survey conducted in 2009, 
workers stated their preferences over bonus schemes (individual or team bonus).  They also 
made decisions in a sequence of hypothetical income gambles, enabling me to construct an 
estimate of each agent’s risk aversion.  In addition to the survey information the data contains 
long records of weekly sales for each worker which permits an accurate estimate of each 
agent’s relative (to team average) workplace productivity.   
The economic self interest hypothesis makes a clear prediction in this case:  Workers 
who consistently produce more than the team average should vote for an individual bonus, 
while those lagging behind ought to go for a team bonus.  The only reason why a selfish   3
worker who, on average, produces more than his team mates may find a team bonus attractive 
is because it diminishes income uncertainty.
2 
  
Controlling for other factors such as gender, length and type of education, age, tenure, 
etc I find that higher sales (relative to the team average) increases the likelihood of preferring 
individual bonuses (p <0,01).  There is also a tendency that workers who reveal more risk 
aversion in the income gambles prefer a team bonus, but this association is more uncertain.    
Although self interest is a strong predictor for the agents’ preferences over pay 
schemes, a relatively large fraction of the workers vote against their economic interests.  
Among those selling consistently above the team average, 69 % prefer individual bonuses, 
while 14,2% prefer a team bonus (the rest express no preference between individual and team 
incentives).  The fraction of low-performers who vote against their economic self interest is 
larger; among the agents who sell below the team average 40 % prefer individual incentives 
while 48% prefer team incentives (the rest are neutral).  
These findings run counter to a strict deterministic interpretation of the self interest 
hypothesis.  One possible explanation, holding on to assumption that workers prefer 
arrangements that maximizes their own income, is that agents performing below average 
believe they will excel and produce above average in the future.  The idea that low performers 
oppose redistribution due to a “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) was first formalised by 
Benabou and Ok 2001.   Another explanation that seems pertinent given the level of 
generosity individuals’ display in lab experiments is that workers vote against their economic 
self interest because they have social preferences.  Note however that the pattern reported 
above is incompatible with the predictions of the inequality aversion model presented in Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999, as inequality aversion cannot account for the fact that it is especially low-
performing workers who favour a payment scheme that goes against their material self-
interests. If egalitarianism is the only fairness standard, individuals who have an aversion 
towards income inequality and who sell below the team average have both selfish and fairness 
reasons for preferring a team bonus.  Hence, the inequality aversion model predicts that we 
should not observe that workers, producing regularly below the average of the team, vote for 
an individual bonus.  To explain the observed pattern in a model where individuals have 
                                                 
2 Differences in preferences over bonus schemes could, in principle, also be traced to differences in beliefs:  
Individuals who believe free riding is a problem may, for efficiency reasons, prefer an individual bonus.  Free 
riding is not an important issue at this workplace.  It is easy for team members to exert peer pressure on each 
other since members are clustered together in an open office landscape.  Each team also has a team leader, a 
coach, who supervises individual team members.   In the survey very few of the responders said that  the team 
bonus suffers from free riding    4
fairness preferences over income distributions, we must allow for a pluralism of norms (see 
Cappelen et al 2007).  I discuss this possibility and alternative explanations for the pattern 
found in the data in section 6 of the paper.  I, start, however with a brief discussion of related 
research.    
  
 
2 Contribution and relation to previous literature 
 When workers know their own relative productivity and free riding is not an issue, as I shall 
argue is the case in this customer service centre, the choice between team and individual pay 
is essentially a choice of how to divide income within a group.  Workers can vote selfishly for 
the bonus that maximizes personal income, or they can be generous and support an alternative 
that increases the income of others at their own cost.  How individuals divide money between 
themselves and others have been studied extensively in the lab over the last two decades.  The 
simplest sharing experiment is the Dictator Game.  Results from this game, and from its 
cousins (for example return decisions in a Trust Game), reveal that many individuals are 
willing to share their money in controlled laboratory experiments, see Camerer 2003 for a 
general discussion of these games.    
A major difference between a standard Dictator Game and the case at hand is that 
when team members express their preference over bonus schemes, the amount they “divide” 
does not fall into their hands as manna from heaven.  The sum to be divided is produced by 
the team members.  There are lab experiments where individuals produce/invest before they 
divide the proceeds (see Cappelen et al 2007 for references).  When production precedes 
distribution entitlement norms affect individuals’ willingness to share.  Individuals who 
contribute more will in general claim a larger share of the pie (Cappelen et al  2007, Esarey et 
al 2011).  Compared to the studies of production and sharing in the lab, this study has 
advantages and drawbacks.   
The production phase is clearly more relevant here than in the lab experiments, where 
participants typically are set to do 10 to 20 minutes of trivial task solving before they divide 
the proceedings.  Another advantage is that the workers I study are familiar with the sharing 
problem they are asked to take a stand on.  For many years the bonus has been based on both 
individual and team sales and the relative importance of team performance has varied over 
time.  In one period team members had to vote over two alternatives; a bonus with 80% 
weight on team sales and 20% on individual sales, or a bonus scheme with opposite weights.      5
I think it is noteworthy that the subjects I study take a stand on a sharing problem they find 
relevant and are familiar with.  Participants in laboratory experiments may feel a bit baffled 
by the strangeness of the situation they are put in.   
A potential drawback of this study is that agents state their preferences over bonus 
schemes; their response has no, at least no immediate, financial consequence.  I am not so 
worried about this.  As pointed out above, the outline of the bonus scheme – and especially 
whether the bonus should be based on individual or team performance - is of real concern for 
these workers.  I see no reason why they should conceal their true preference in the survey.  
On the contrary, if they believe that the results from the study will be used to craft a new 
bonus scheme, they have every reason to state how they really rank the alternatives.   
 
3 The workplace and the bonus scheme 
The workers provide customer services trough an inbound call centre. A computer based 
phone system automatically channels new calls to available personnel. Operators use the 
computer to obtain the information they need to assist customers, and to register new 
information in the customer data base. Their main assignment is to update existing clients 
about their insurance coverage, notify them if there are any changes that seem relevant and 
inform them about new products that are available.  All this should be done as fast as possible, 
in a friendly and courteous way. In addition to the service assignment, the operators sell 
insurance products. The customer service unit is an important sales channel in the company 
(approximately 30% of the company's total sales come from the customer service centre).  
In 2009 at the time when the survey was conducted, 108 full time agents were 
employed at the customer service centre.  The average age of the agents was 32 years. The 
typical employee has 2 or 3 years of college education, often in business and economics, and 
has worked for this company for 4 years. There is a surplus of women (60%) working in the 
customer service centre. 
Agents belong to teams consisting of 8 - 15 employees. Team members are clustered 
together in an open office landscape. Each team has a team leader who organizes, motivates 
and supervises the agents.  Although agents belong to teams, their work duties are to a large 
extent individualistic; only rarely do they need assistance from team mates to do their job.   
The bonus scheme agents were asked to assess in the survey was introduced in 2001 to 
enhance sales.  At the start performance related pay amounted to (on average) 5% of the 
salary.  In 2009 performance pay had increased to 14% of total compensation.  In an attempt   6
to balance sales incentives the company has also rewarded a number of variables that captures 
the quality of the services that are provided (claims ratio, customer renewal and contract 
renewal).  The sales bonus is, however, by far the most important element, as it accounts for 
90 % of variable pay.   
At its introduction the bonus was fully team based.  Since 2004, however, the sales 
bonus has depended on both individual and team sales.  The weight assigned to individual 
performance (relative to team performance) has varied over time.  To receive the individual 
bonus the agent must sell more than 102% of an assigned sales budget.   For sales above that 
level the bonus increases in steps.  The team receives a bonus if the team members together 
produce more than 102 % of the team budget (which is equal to the sum of the individual 
budgets).  The team members are instructed to register sales online.  At any time they are able 
to keep track of their own sales relative to the budget, and also how well their team is doing.  
The team leader will often inform the members if they are lagging behind and need to 
improve their performance in order to pass the hurdle that releases a bonus.    
 
 
4 The data  
The data comes from two different sources.  In a survey conducted (via email) in the end of 
September 2009, the agents answered a battery of questions concerning their attitudes towards 
risks, preferred bonus design, main motivation for exerting effort, team and company 
identification etc.  The survey was sent via email to 108 persons, of which 5 turned out to be 
on long term leave.  Of the 103 persons who could answer the survey, 80 did.  Of the 
responders, 68 persons were employed as full time customer service agents, the rest were 
either team leaders or workers with work duties that excluded them from taking part in the 
bonus scheme (they did not sell insurance).   
  In addition to self reported attitudes and preferences, I have weekly registered data on 
a number of individual workplace behaviours.  This information is collected from a 
computerized phone system.  It records on a weekly basis for each agent the number of 
minutes they are logged on the phone system, sick absence, the number phones they answer, 
how many units they sell and the premium value of their sales.  It also includes a record of 
which team each agent belongs to.   
The aim of this study is to examine how agents’ preferred bonus system relates to risk 
aversion and relative productivity.  Let me therefore briefly describe each of these variables.     7
 
Preferred bonus scheme: Agents were asked to respond to the following statement:   
“I think the bonus should be based on individual performance, not on team performance”.  
They responded along a Likert scale, with the following alternatives “totally agree”, “agree”, 
“neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”, “totally disagree”.   My interpretation of the 
responses is that those who answer “totally agree” are strongly in favour of individual 
bonuses, while those who ticked of “totally disagree” are strongly in favour of a team bonus.   
 
Risk preferences: Agents made a sequence of choices among two different job alternatives, 
one with a sure income identical to current income, the other alternative was a risky job that 
paid either twice the amount of the current job or only a fraction λ < 1 of the current salary, 
both outcomes being equally likely.
3  The initial gamble was described as follows:  
    
“Suppose that you are the only income earner in your household. Suppose also that reasons 
beyond your control force you to change occupation. You can choose between two 
alternatives. Job 1 guarantees you the same income as your current income. Job 2 gives you a 
50% chance of an income twice as high as your current income, but with a 50% chance it 
results in a reduction of your current income by one third. What is your immediate reaction? 
Would you choose job 1 or job 2?” 
 
After having made a choice the respondents got a new pair of alternatives.  Agents, who 
selected the safe job in the first round, got an alternative with a higher λ (it increased from 2/3 
to 4/5).  Those who preferred the risky job in the first stage got a new risky alternative with a 
lower λ (it fell from 2/3 to 1/2).  Based on the choices made, and excluding risk loving 
attitudes, each agent can be classified with a λ in one of four intervals: [0, ½], (½, ⅔], (⅔, 
4/5], or (4/5, 1].  These intervals have a natural ordering from “weakly risk averse” to “very 
risk averse”.      
 
Relative productivity (“Diff-sales”):  The data on workplace behaviour runs from 2003 until 
the end of 2009.  In the analysis I use data from week 13 in 2009 until the week the survey 
was conducted (week 31) to estimate individual productivity.  I have chosen a relatively 
narrow time window for different reasons.  If agents want a bonus that maximizes their own 
                                                 
3 My approach to elicit risk aversion is equivalent to the one used in Aarbu and Schroyen 2009, which builds on 
Barsky at al 1997.     8
income it is their current (future) relative productivity that should guide their choice of 
payment schemes.  The problem with using just a few weeks of production to assess 
productivity is measurement errors.  Having 18 weeks of production should, however, be 
sufficient to get a reasonably precise assessment of individual productivity.   
A more mundane reason for confining attention to production after week 13 in 2009, is 
that a new team was established in week 12 of that year and this team recruited most of its 
workers from existing teams.  Hence, if I extend the time window and include production 
prior to the second quarter of 2009 I would not get unique team identification for each worker.  
For each worker I have calculated the weekly difference between the value (premium value) 
of own sales and the mean value of all other team members’ sales. It is worth noting that this 
variable is not based only on the sales of those who answered the survey, but on the sales of 
all team members. The variable Diff-sales aggregates this difference over all the relevant 
weeks.  Sales data for 92 individual workers is used to construct the Diff-sales variable.  A 
person who has the value 20 000 on the Diff-sales variable sells on average insurance with a 
premium value that 20 000 krone above the team average.   
 Figure 1, panel (a) plots the distribution of the average weekly insurance premium of 
sales for the relevant period for all the workers included in this study, measured in 1000 NOK 
units.  One Norwegian Krone (NOK) is worth around 1/6 of a US$, so on average the 
premium value of weekly sales is around 10 000 US$.  Panel (b) depicts the distribution of the 
variable Diff-sales measured in 1000 NOK units.  
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It is interesting to compare sales for those who answered the questionnaire with those who did 
not in order to check if there is a systematic difference between the groups.  Table 1 lists the 
mean and standard errors (in brackets below) for key variables.  Although there are some 
differences in the means across the two groups (especially in the Diff-sales variable) none of 
them are significant at any conventional level.  
 
Table 1: Differences between responders and non-responders  
Variable   Responders (N=68)  Non-responders (N=24) 
 

































     
Note: The variable Age-group is equal to 1 if the person was born before 1955; 2 if birth date is in the interval 
“1956-1961”; 3 if birth date is in the interval "1961-1965" etc.  
 
 
5  Regression results   
From Table 1, we can see that workers who favour individual bonuses sell considerably more 
than their team mates.  They also tend to be less risk averse than their colleagues.  The Mean-
lambda variable that is reported in the Table 1 is constructed as follows.  The choices made in 
the hypothetical income gamble classify agents into different “lambda intervals”.   To assign   10
an exact lambda value to each worker I have given each of them  the mean value of the 
interval they belong to; agents making choices that assign them to the lowest interval gets a λ 
equal to 0.25 agents in the second lowest interval gets a value 0.58 etc.  The Mean-lambda 
value is the average λ value of the agents who display the same bonus preference.   The table 
also reveal a tendency for men to favour a bonus based on individual performance.  I have 
also cross tabulated many other variables one might expect would vary with preferred bonus 
scheme (for example type of education (economics or not, tenure, etc.)  but I did not detect 
any interesting patterns.  
 
Table 2: Cross tabulation of preferred bonus against Diff-sales, risk aversion and gender 
Preferred bonus 
scheme 




Strongly in favour 

































In favour of team 
bonus 
 
14 (20%)   -12685,8  0,80  3 (21%) 
Strongly in favour 
of team bonus 




Table 2 reports the results from a multivariate regression.  The dependent variable is the 
preferred bonus system. It is numerically coded such that 1 is given to those who strongly 
prefer individual bonuses, and 5 to those who strongly prefer team bonus.  I have estimated a 
linear model (OLS) and an ordered logit model (olog).  To capture the relationship between 
bonus preferences and risk aversion I created a dummy for individuals with high risk 
aversion; the variable High-risk takes the value 1 if lambda belongs to the interval [⅔, 1].
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Table 2:  OLS and Ordered Logit: The dependent variable is preferred bonus scheme.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ols1  ols2  olog1  olog2 
      
Diff-sale  -0,0188*** -0,0179*** -0,0317*** -0,0307*** 
  (0,0062) (0,0061) (0,0107) (0,0108) 
      
High-risk  0,4409 0,4345 0,7517  0,7900* 
  (0,2718) (0,2685) (0,4649) (0,4679) 
      
Male   -0,4371  -0,7417 
   (0,2719)  (0,4704) 
      
Cons 2,3953***  2,5673***    
 (0,2030)  (0,2273)     
N  68 68 68 68 
R
2 0.144  0.178    
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
The regressions confirm that the workers tend to prefer a bonus scheme that maximizes their 
own income.  The table also show that risk aversion relates negatively with a preference for 
individual pay, this association has a p-value of around 0,1.   When we control for risk 
aversion and sales gender has no significant direct impact on bonus preferences.   The OLS 
coefficients for Diff-sales have a straightforward interpretation.  Consider for example the 
ols2 specification, an increase in Diff-sales of 60 (if the absolute value of the difference 
between own sales and the team average sales increases with 60 000 NOK, that is 
approximately two standard deviations) is associated with one unit increase in the stated 
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6  Discussion 
Although economic self interest serves as a good predictor for preferences over bonus 
systems, the fit is far from perfect.  Among the 37 workers who sell more than the average of 
their team, 6 prefer a team bonus.  Among the 31 workers who sell less than the team average, 
as many as 17 prefer an individual bonus. What explains the apparent deviation from self-
interest? 
Perhaps workers vote for a scheme that reduces their own income because there are 
mistaken about their own productivity.  Given the emphasis there is on sales and the sales 
bonus in this firm, and the fact that part of the bonus depend on what the team sell, I do not 
find this explanation very convincing.   However, even workers who are fully aware of their 
current poor relative production, and who only care about their own income, may rationally 
prefer an individual bonus scheme if they foresee a rise in their relative performance in the 
future.  This is the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) idea that explored by Benabou and 
Ok 2001.  How can we examine the relevance POUM?  Expectations of future relative 
performance are most likely based on the current trend in production.  Hence, if it is the 
prospect of upward mobility that explains why low achievers prefer individual bonuses, we 
should observe that the workers who currently produce below the average but who 
nevertheless favour individual incentives are on a steeper trend than the rest of their team 
mates.  I have tested this conjecture and there is no evidence for such a pattern in the data.  
Another reason why workers may prefer a bonus scheme that reduces their own 
income is fairness considerations.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest that individuals are, in 
varying degree, inequality averse.  In their model individuals trade off the utility derived from 
own income against the costs of deviating from an equal distribution of income.  The weight 
assigned to the inequality costs varies between individuals and it is sensitive to whether an 
individual is above or below the average.  Inequality aversion can explain why some of the 
high achievers prefer a team bonus, but it cannot account for the fact that it is especially 
among workers with poor performance we find those who prefer a bonus scheme that oppose 
their financial interests.  An inequality averse worker who sell less than the team average 
faces no trade off between self interest and fairness since a team bonus minimizes inequity 
costs and maximizes own income.    
Egalitarianism is, however, not the only reasonable fairness ideal when production 
precedes distribution.  In such a setting one could argue in favour of a meritocratic fairness   13
principle which rewards individuals according to their contributions, for example measured 
by production.
5  A worker who endorses the meritocratic fairness principle and produces 
below the team average faces a real trade off when he has to choose between a team based or 
individual based bonus:  By choosing an individual bonus he sacrifices money in order to act 
in accordance with his fairness standard; by choosing a team bonus he earns more money but 
violates his fairness ideal.  If this worker is sufficiently fair minded, that is, if he experiences a 
sufficiently high utility loss by deviating from the proportionality principle, he will vote for an 
individual bonus, even though a team bonus would give him a higher income.  A model with 
two fairness standards, equality and meritocracy, and with workers who differ with respect to 
how fair minded they are (how much income they are willing to forgo in order to behave in 
accordance with their fairness standard) could certainly explain the pattern observe in the 
data.   
The mere fact that such a model can reproduce patterns in the data does not mean it 
captures the main motives behind the choices made. I would argue there is another 
mechanism that needs to be taken into account and that is how team pay intensifies 
(perceived) negative social judgments and the unpleasantness of lagging behind in a team.  A 
team bonus accentuates relative productivity within a team. It is unpleasant to be reminded 
that one is an under-performer.  It is perhaps even more unpleasant to be reminded by other 
team members that one is dragging down their performance and income.  Hence, I think it 
plausible that some of the low productivity workers voted for an individual bonus not because 
it is a choice in accordance with their fairness ideal, but because such a bonus alleviates the 
stigma, stress, guilt and shame associated with having below average productivity.   
The fairness model is extremely cerebral; the focus is on how well the distribution of 
incomes adheres to a fairness principle. It does not take into account the social aspect of 
interaction, that is, how it feels to be a low productivity worker in a production team.  A 
growing body of evidence show that individuals do not only care about the distribution of 
outcomes (income) but also about the perceived social appraisal that is associated with final 
outcomes, or the process leading up to these outcomes, see List (2007) and Fershtman et al 
(2008).  The psychological mechanisms that are evoked in work groups are hard to incite in 
anonymous one shot lab experiments, but Charness and Dufwenberg 2006 makes an attempt 
to address the relevance of one such mechanism.  They suggest that co-workers, or partners, 
expectations may have an impact on behaviour due to guilt aversion: it feels bad not to live up 
                                                 
5 For a thorough discussion of production and fairness the reader should consult Cappelen at al 2007.     14
to others’ expectations.  They find experimental evidence for this supposition, but this result 
is contested (Ellingsen et al 2010).  My conjecture is that this mechanism is important in team 
work and may therefore explain why low productivity workers prefer individual bonus 
schemes.   
  
6 Conclusions 
Economic theory assumes that material self interest and risk aversion are central motivations 
in economic interactions.  Hence, this theory makes a strong prediction when workers, who is 
well informed about their own relative productivity, has to choose between a team based or 
individual based bonus scheme:  Workers with high productivity will choose an individual 
bonus scheme.  The only concern that may weaken this preference is risk aversion.   I have 
tested this conjecture with data from a real firm.  The conclusion is that the economic model 
predicts the case at hand fairly well.  The most noticeable divergence from the prediction of 
the economic model is that there is a large fraction of low productivity workers who prefer an 
individual bonus scheme.  Since it is unlikely that it is the prospect of upward mobility 
(POUM) in production that explains this departure from income maximization, it is natural to 
presume there are concerns beyond self regarding income maximization that compel low 
performers to vote for an individual bonus.  I have argued that there are two different types of 
other regarding concerns that can explain these behavioural patterns; distributional fairness 
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